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FedInverse: Evaluating Privacy Leakage in Federated Learning

Di Wu, Jun Bai, Yiliao Song, Junjun Chen, Wei Zhou, Yong Xiang and Atul Sajjanhar

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
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

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Model Inversion Attacks



FedInverse



Algorithm


Algorithm 1 *FedInverse Algorithm*. K indicates the number of participants and k represents the participant number; B represents the local batch size, E indicates the local training epochs, C is the participation rate of participants, while η is learning rate; G and D denote Generator and Discriminator respectively, \mathcal{P}_{aux} represents the auxiliary dataset used to pre-train GAN, \mathcal{N} denotes the Gaussian distribution, while \mathcal{Q}_t indicates the set of generated images by FedInverse.

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1: Server Initialization:  $\omega_0$ 
2: for each training round  $t = 1, 2 \dots$  do
3:    $m \leftarrow \max(C \cdot K, 1)$ 
4:    $S_t \leftarrow$  (random set of  $m$  participants including
    a single Attacker)
5:   for each participant  $k \in S_t$  in parallel do
6:      $\omega_{t+1}^k \leftarrow \text{ParticipantUpdate}(k, \omega_t)$ 
7:     evaluate on  $\mathcal{Q}_t \leftarrow \text{Attacker}(\omega_t)$ 
8:   end for
9:    $\omega_{t+1} \leftarrow \sum_{k=1}^K \frac{n_k}{n} \omega_{t+1}^k$ 
10: end for
11:
12: function ATTACKER( $\omega_t$ ):
13:   if needed then
14:     pretrain  $G$  and  $D$  with  $\omega_t$  on  $\mathcal{P}_{aux}$ 
15:   else
16:     load pretrained  $G$  and  $D$ 
17:   end if
18:   for each attack epoch do
19:     for batch  $z \in \mathcal{N}$  do
20:        $x \leftarrow G(z)$ 
21:       split  $x$  into  $x_1$  and  $x_2$ 
22:       compute HSIC( $x_1, x_2$ )
23:       update  $z'$  for diversity optimization
24:     end for
25:      $x' \leftarrow G(z')$ 
26:      $\mathcal{Q}_t \leftarrow \mathcal{Q}_t \cup \{x'\}$ 
27:   end for
28:   return  $\mathcal{Q}_t$ 
29: end function
30:
31: function PARTICIPANTUPDATE( $k, \omega_t$ ):
32:    $\mathcal{B} \leftarrow$  (split  $\mathcal{P}_k$  into batches of Size  $B$ )
33:   for each local epoch  $i$  from 1 to  $E$  do
34:     for batch  $b \in \mathcal{B}$  do
35:        $\omega_t \leftarrow \omega_t - \eta \nabla l(\omega_t; b)$ 
36:     end for
37:   end for
38:   return  $\omega_t$  to server
39: end function

```

FedInverse and HSIC



Results




Figure 5: FedInverse on CelebA. Columns (a)-(c) present the relevant curves for three chosen MI/MI-HSIC attacks on CelebA under specific FL conditions. The first row of subplots illustrates global model accuracy changes over communication rounds. Rows two to four display comparative results using Attack Acc, Attack Acc5, and FID metrics for these attacks across ten federated rounds.

Table 1: FL privacy leakage indicated by Attack Acc/Acc5 \pm standard deviation(%) and FID on MNIST via FedInverse using GMI and GMI-HSIC with prior training dataset MNIST. Bold values denote the best metric results obtained by GMI or GMI-HSIC throughout the FL training epoch. The symbol $\downarrow(\uparrow)$ denotes that smaller (larger) values are favored.

Metrics	Methods	FL#R01	FL#R02	FL#R03	FL#R04	FL#R05
Accuracy \uparrow		83.34	97.59	98.27	98.4	98.52
Attack Acc \uparrow	GMI	34.00 \pm 9.66	38.00 \pm 22.01	34.00 \pm 16.47	50.00 \pm 10.54	56.00\pm20.66
	GMI-HSIC	44.00 \pm 15.78	44.00 \pm 12.65	42.00 \pm 14.76	56.00 \pm 8.43	60.00\pm9.43
Attack Acc5 \uparrow	GMI	94.00 \pm 9.66	98.00\pm6.32	98.00\pm6.32	96.00 \pm 8.43	98.00\pm6.32
	GMI-HSIC	96.00 \pm 8.43	98.00 \pm 6.32	98.00 \pm 6.32	100.00\pm0.00	98.00 \pm 6.32
FID \downarrow	GMI	20.1373	23.3598	22.3839	17.1018	16.7486
	GMI-HSIC	19.0845	21.1116	21.5377	15.6066	14.469

Table 2: FL privacy leakage indicated by Attack Acc/Acc5 \pm standard deviation(%) and FID on MNIST via FedInverse using KED-MI and KED-MI-HSIC with prior training dataset MNIST. Bold values denote the best metric results obtained by KED-MI or KED-MI-HSIC throughout the FL training epoch. The symbol $\downarrow(\uparrow)$ denotes that smaller (larger) values are favored.

Metrics	Methods	FL#R01	FL#R02	FL#R03	FL#R04	FL#R05
Accuracy \uparrow		83.34	97.59	98.27	98.4	98.52
Attack Acc \uparrow	KED-MI	64.60 \pm 8.46	60.60 \pm 4.45	80.00\pm0.00	80.00\pm0.00	79.80 \pm 2.00
	KED-MI-HSIC	80.00 \pm 0.00	64.40 \pm 8.33	80.00 \pm 0.00	80.20\pm2.00	80.20\pm2.00
Attack Acc5 \uparrow	KED-MI	100.00 \pm 0.00	100.00 \pm 0.00	100.00 \pm 0.00	100.00 \pm 0.00	100.00 \pm 0.00
	KED-MI-HSIC	100.00 \pm 0.00	100.00 \pm 0.00	100.00 \pm 0.00	100.00 \pm 0.00	100.00 \pm 0.00
FID \downarrow	KED-MI	209.1448	206.0789	195.1807	184.995	175.9532
	KED-MI-HSIC	204.5017	198.6938	175.9532	161.0252	160.9891



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