When Style Breaks Safety: Defending LLMs Against Superficial Style Alignment

Large language models (LLMs) can be prompted with specific styles (e.g., formatting responses as lists), including in malicious queries. Prior jailbreak research mainly augments these queries with additional string transformations to maximize attack success rate (ASR). However, the impact of style patterns in the original queries that are semantically irrelevant to the malicious intent remains unclear. In this work, we seek to understand whether style patterns compromise LLM safety, how superficial style alignment increases model vulnerability, and how best to mitigate these risks during alignment. We first define ASR inflation as the increase in ASR due to style patterns in existing jailbreak benchmark queries. By evaluating $32$ LLMs across seven benchmarks, we find that nearly all models exhibit ASR inflation. Notably, the inflation correlates with an LLM's relative attention to style patterns, which also overlap more with its instruction-tuning data when inflation occurs. We then investigate superficial style alignment, and find that fine-tuning with specific styles makes LLMs more vulnerable to jailbreaks of those same styles. Finally, we propose SafeStyle, a defense strategy that incorporates a small amount of safety training data augmented to match the distribution of style patterns in the fine-tuning data. Across three LLMs, six fine-tuning style settings, and two real-world instruction-tuning datasets, SafeStyle consistently outperforms baselines in maintaining LLM safety.